The following four bills will be open for testimony by the public on Thursday March 28 starting at 1 pm. This is an opportunity for our group to speak of the issues we have had to deal with concerning Guardians ad litem, the Judiciary and Divorce Industry. The three that would help parents and children are LD 551, 872 and 975. LD 522 is a bill from the Judiciary which would take control in house of Guardians ad litem. In almost 40 years they have not been able to correct problems that many in the Judiciary and divorce industry do not see. Should LD 522 pass it would mean that reform would be a dead issue at least for this session. What ever momentum we currently have would be lost. The fight will be harder. How many families and children have to be hurt before there is meaningful change? You will have an opportunity to stop that hurt and help others that are experiencing the horrors of a Guardian ad litem gone wrong. Your voice is needed. Please help
LD 522, SP 212, An Act To Amend the Guardian Ad Litem Laws
Link to PDF of bill: LD 522, SP 212
Link to schedule
LD 551, HP 370, An Act To Establish Certification Standards for
Guardians Ad Litem
Link to PDF of bill: LD 551, HP 370
Link to schedule
LD 872, SP 297, An Act To Improve the Quality of Guardian ad Litem
Services for the Children and Families of Maine
Link to PDF of bill: LD 872, SP 297
Link to schedule
LD 975, HP 689, An Act To Ensure Accountability of Guardians Ad Litem
and Parenting Coordinators
Link to PDF of bill: LD 975, HP 689
Link to schedule
For more information please contact us at MeGALalert@gmail.com or like us on Facebook for up to date information on Guardian ad litem reform. In addition please find below the email addresses of our representatives who are on the Judiciary Committee. Write to them and let them know how Guardian ad litem reform is important to you. How it is important to divorcing families. But.... mostly how important it is to our children who will continue to be harmed by the current process.
Judiciary Committee List:
Linda M. Valentino D York County P. O. Box 1049 Saco ME 04072 (207) 282-5227
senatorvalentino@gmail.com
John L. Tuttle Jr. D York County 176 Cottage Street Sanford ME 04073 (207) 324-5964
SenJohn.Tuttle@legislature.maine.gov
David C. Burns R Washington County 159 Dodge Road Whiting ME 04691 (207) 733-8856
SenDavid.Burns@legislature.maine.gov
Charles R. Priest D Brunswick 9 Bowker Street Brunswick ME 04011 (207) 725-5439
cpriest1@comcast.net RepCharles.Priest@legislature.maine.gov
Kimberly J. Monaghan-Derrig D Cape Elizabeth 6 Russet Lane Cape Elizabeth ME 04107 (207) 749-9443
kmderrig@maine.rr.com RepKim.Monaghan-Derrig@legislature.maine.gov
Jennifer DeChant D Bath 1008 Middle Street Bath ME 04530 (207) 442-8486
dechantforbath@gmail.com RepJennifer.DeChant@legislature.maine.gov
Matthew W. Moonen D Portland 17 Pine Street #2 Portland ME 04102 (207) 332-7823
matt.moonen@gmail.com RepMatt.Moonen@legislature.maine.gov
Stephen W. Moriarty D Cumberland 34 Blanchard Road Cumberland ME 04021 (207) 829-5095
smoriarty108@aol.com repsteve.moriarty@legislature.maine.gov
Lisa Renee Villa D Harrison P. O. Box 427 Harrison ME 04040 (207) 776-3118
Villa98staterep@gmail.com RepLisa.Villa@legislature.maine.gov
Jarrod S. Crockett R Bethel P. O. Box 701 Bethel ME 04217 (207) 875-5075
jarrodscrockett@gmail.com RepJarrod.Crockett@legislature.maine.gov
Michael G. Beaulieu R Auburn 27 Sherman Avenue Auburn ME 04210 (207) 784-0036
mike@mikeformaine.org RepMike.Beaulieu@legislature.maine.gov
Anita Peavey Haskell R Milford 17 Pine Street Milford ME 04461 (207) 827-7296
RepAnita.Peaveyhaskell@legislature.maine.gov
Stacey K. Guerin R Glenburn 79 Phillips Road Glenburn ME 04401 (207) 884-7118
repguerin@gmail.com RepStacey.Guerin@legislature.maine.gov
Wayne T. Mitchell D Penobscot Nation 14 Oak Hill Street, Penobscot Nation Indian Island ME 04468 (207) 827-0392
waymitch10@hotmail.com RepWayne.Mitchell@legislature.maine.gov
Showing posts with label OPEGA. Show all posts
Showing posts with label OPEGA. Show all posts
Thursday, March 14, 2013
Saturday, January 12, 2013
Courts Support the Abuse of Our Children – Ka Ching it is all about the Money
Not your child's best interest
In any custody case where a Guardian ad litem of Parental Coordinator is involved they are supposed to report to DHHS (In Maine) if a “child has been or is likely to be abused or neglected, must make an immediate report to the Department of Human Services.” as stated in the Guardian ad litem Standards and Rules on the Maine Judiciary web site (look for 6.1 Mandated Reporting).
The reality of the situation that we have been made aware of is that Guardians ad litem rarely report abuse or neglect. How could this happen? Guardians ad litem are supposed to have the child's best interest at hand. Or is it maybe that Guardians ad litem have their own best interest. By reporting to DHHS such things as -
a child that was burned by a cigarette.
a child that went to bars late at night.
a child that was better off with a sex offender.
a child that was better off with a parent that had drug issues.
Ka ching – the cash register stops for the Guardian ad litem. The Guardian ad litem also ends up playing a marginalized and insignificant role in the childs life and the custody battle. The Guardian ad litem gives up control. People with any shred of common sense would question how a child burned by a cigarette is not considered abuse. Or that by placing a child with a known sex offender is safe and not a recipe for trouble. Yet when we are talking about these 'professionals' in the court system we look the other way. We are in a sense giving our approval for this continued abuse perpetuated by our courts and the divorce industry. Ka ching – it is about the money and not about your child.
Maine has received the grade of ( F ) by First Star three reports in a row. Maine is criticized by the Center for Judicial Excellence for the issues within the system. Chief Justice Saufley in March of 2012 indicated that there were problems with GALs in the state. OPEGA in 2006 outlined problems with the system. The courts reiterated this finding in 2008. Yet the divorce industry has been satisfied with the status quo. “Make them pay” was the quote of one well established divorce lawyer during one of the committee meetings on GAL reform. Who really has the best interest of the child in any divorce? A stranger whose incentive is how many billable hours they can get out? Or the families that are thrown into a pit of insanity that we call Justice? You be the judge ka ching.
If your child(ren) have been abused by the system you are not alone. We are a growing grassroots organization that is fighting for reform please contact us at MeGALalert@gmail.com or like us on Facebook for up to date information.
If you want to let your Senator or Representative know what your thoughts are on the current broke system that the divorce industry and courts maintain contact us for their information.
Thursday, December 6, 2012
JUDICIAL BRANCH MANAGEMENT DILEMMA
In
thinking about why the Judicial Branch has such difficulty in
creating a management system for its GAL program, a number of
conceptual and structural impediments come to mind. The most readily
acknowledged issue is no money for supervision or for a bureaucratic
structure that would allow for normal bureaucratic management of
Guardians ad litem (GAL). The financial excuse is probably true given
the dire financial straights of the state, but we would say in
addition that even were money available, there are more serious
conceptual impediments preventing Judicial Branch’s internal
management of Guardians ad litem. There are at least three conceptual
issues that would make supervision or management of Guardians ad
litem in any Judicial system fraught with legal and ethical problems
unique to judicial branches of government.
The issues involve internal conflicts inherent in normal organizational role shifts, within a judicial system, from the role of supervision of vocational functioning of a supervisee to the administration of justice in cases involving complaints about supervision which seek legal solutions. Both GAL management and adjudication of formal, legal complaints about a Guardian’s management get very complex when these inherently conflicting activities have to occur within the same, small, fairly tight system. It would require a tight control over supervisory information and rigid compartmentalization of this information, so that information about supervision and management - and any conflict therein - does not seep into formal adjudication channels and pollute the fairness of any possible, future legal complaint process. Can it be done?
1.) Judicial Independence. In the spirit of Common Law, a judge is supposed to form his/her judgment about a case independently, uninfluenced (unswayed) by other branches of government or by partisan, community (or bureaucratic) politics.
This means standing apart from and being independent of politics and influence from the other branches of government. It should include not only formal political influence of the branches, but also government bureaucratic influences, including those of the judge’s own internal bureaucracy. This means using data presented in court by both parties to form an independent opinion and not to be swayed by outside influences or outside information or previous knowledge of the case. It would be difficult for a judge to resolve independently legal actions of any kind involving a Guardian ad litem; especially, a GAL with whom he/she has worked in court or even one who is known to the judicial system. Judicial independence gets damaged by foreknowledge of the GAL, by working relationships, by the rumors, by system gossip, by the system grapevines and by private awareness of the contentions.
The issues involve internal conflicts inherent in normal organizational role shifts, within a judicial system, from the role of supervision of vocational functioning of a supervisee to the administration of justice in cases involving complaints about supervision which seek legal solutions. Both GAL management and adjudication of formal, legal complaints about a Guardian’s management get very complex when these inherently conflicting activities have to occur within the same, small, fairly tight system. It would require a tight control over supervisory information and rigid compartmentalization of this information, so that information about supervision and management - and any conflict therein - does not seep into formal adjudication channels and pollute the fairness of any possible, future legal complaint process. Can it be done?
1.) Judicial Independence. In the spirit of Common Law, a judge is supposed to form his/her judgment about a case independently, uninfluenced (unswayed) by other branches of government or by partisan, community (or bureaucratic) politics.
This means standing apart from and being independent of politics and influence from the other branches of government. It should include not only formal political influence of the branches, but also government bureaucratic influences, including those of the judge’s own internal bureaucracy. This means using data presented in court by both parties to form an independent opinion and not to be swayed by outside influences or outside information or previous knowledge of the case. It would be difficult for a judge to resolve independently legal actions of any kind involving a Guardian ad litem; especially, a GAL with whom he/she has worked in court or even one who is known to the judicial system. Judicial independence gets damaged by foreknowledge of the GAL, by working relationships, by the rumors, by system gossip, by the system grapevines and by private awareness of the contentions.
A
theoretical problem might start with supervisory discord between a
GAL and his/her supervisor about an issue of supervision, leading to
an internal management hearing and subsequently pursued in a formal
court complaint. It might go the full route in court and continue as
a case of higher level appeal. Administrative supervision within any
such JB system - if there were conflicts - might at some point be apt
to tangle with the branches’ system for administering formal
justice, as those with supervisory grievances may seek legal appeal.
It poses a huge bureaucratic challenge to keep information from these
supervision and justice boundaries clean, separate and
non-communicating in a single, small bureaucracy. This is a very
special supervisory problem (unique?) for judicial systems, one that
is not faced by administrative bureaucracies in other branches of
government. Judicial independence, while an active member of a
bureaucratic branch of government is challenging to say the
least.
Having a non-judge be supervisor of a GAL would necessitate a bureaucracy to supervise the supervisor, a supervisory appellate process for conflicts arising out of supervision, and links within the same system to the judiciary for conflicts that "go legal". Judicial independence in Judicial Branches would necessitate a “Rube Goldberg” organizational structure and be strained to the degree that all judges would have to adopt an antisocial, personal ‘modus operandi’ to avoid contamination of their independence by normal internal organizational grapevines and normal organizational politics. And this would have to be at all times for perhaps an actually limited number of internal legal complaints. Can independence of one’s home bureaucracy be carried out, always, with any kind of credibility? What sort of person would avoid all informal social communications with system wide colleagues to be judicially independent? It is an example of the latent conflicting strains between supervision and legal functions within the same system that inevitably impinge on judicial independence.
2.) Judicial Impartiality. There are special challenges to maintaining judicial impartiality when one sits in formal judgment of a person who works in the same bureaucratic system, who is appointed by colleagues, who works for colleagues and friends in that system, who may be known personally or by reputation or rumor. The potential role conflicts and/or impartiality conflicts would seem enormous when colleagues, friends, coworkers must attempt to render impartial judgment. Can it happen? Can one have oversight of a working colleague (and at the same time maintain impartiality), with the unavoidable risk that the working colleague might at some point go to law with a formal complaint for some sort of problem resolution, which cannot be resolved in supervision? It is another serious conceptual impediment to the Judicial Branch system supervising or having oversight of GALs.
3.) Due Process. Implies that in a conflict, all parties and the judge will share in common, knowledge about the complaint and the case at the same time, and that everyone has equal opportunities to respond to all steps in the process. No one has the special advantage of being able to use secret information unknown to the other players or privately to exert undue influence. Well run courts are scrupulous about keeping all relevant information shared by all participants and to avoid ‘ex parte’ communications so no one has use of special knowledge not available to the others. Information has a power of its own to determine or influence outcomes. The idea of protecting due process poses special challenges to the hypothetical idea of supervision or of oversight within a judicial system, where all supervisory and oversight information would have to be kept rigidly apart from the justice side to avoid contaminating possible future due process in a hypothetical legal complaint from the same players. Can any organization - even a formal espionage organization - implement this degree of control over information that is internal to one part of the system in order to prevent seepage into another part of the same system?
These ideas are just a few conceptual and system reasons, why it is virtually an impossibility for the JB to construct a system of GAL oversight without violating very important traditional principles that are embedded in administering the law. This is not in any way to suggest that these principles are not vitally important and necessary in a court of law and need to be respected. It is simply to try to understand why these same respected principles that work so well in court render supervision of GALs virtually impossible in Judicial systems. It is the reason why many states have surrendered to the impossibility of doing supervision/oversight within their judicial branch and moved these activities to the administrative/executive branch.
Maine should do this for the same reasons.
Having a non-judge be supervisor of a GAL would necessitate a bureaucracy to supervise the supervisor, a supervisory appellate process for conflicts arising out of supervision, and links within the same system to the judiciary for conflicts that "go legal". Judicial independence in Judicial Branches would necessitate a “Rube Goldberg” organizational structure and be strained to the degree that all judges would have to adopt an antisocial, personal ‘modus operandi’ to avoid contamination of their independence by normal internal organizational grapevines and normal organizational politics. And this would have to be at all times for perhaps an actually limited number of internal legal complaints. Can independence of one’s home bureaucracy be carried out, always, with any kind of credibility? What sort of person would avoid all informal social communications with system wide colleagues to be judicially independent? It is an example of the latent conflicting strains between supervision and legal functions within the same system that inevitably impinge on judicial independence.
2.) Judicial Impartiality. There are special challenges to maintaining judicial impartiality when one sits in formal judgment of a person who works in the same bureaucratic system, who is appointed by colleagues, who works for colleagues and friends in that system, who may be known personally or by reputation or rumor. The potential role conflicts and/or impartiality conflicts would seem enormous when colleagues, friends, coworkers must attempt to render impartial judgment. Can it happen? Can one have oversight of a working colleague (and at the same time maintain impartiality), with the unavoidable risk that the working colleague might at some point go to law with a formal complaint for some sort of problem resolution, which cannot be resolved in supervision? It is another serious conceptual impediment to the Judicial Branch system supervising or having oversight of GALs.
3.) Due Process. Implies that in a conflict, all parties and the judge will share in common, knowledge about the complaint and the case at the same time, and that everyone has equal opportunities to respond to all steps in the process. No one has the special advantage of being able to use secret information unknown to the other players or privately to exert undue influence. Well run courts are scrupulous about keeping all relevant information shared by all participants and to avoid ‘ex parte’ communications so no one has use of special knowledge not available to the others. Information has a power of its own to determine or influence outcomes. The idea of protecting due process poses special challenges to the hypothetical idea of supervision or of oversight within a judicial system, where all supervisory and oversight information would have to be kept rigidly apart from the justice side to avoid contaminating possible future due process in a hypothetical legal complaint from the same players. Can any organization - even a formal espionage organization - implement this degree of control over information that is internal to one part of the system in order to prevent seepage into another part of the same system?
These ideas are just a few conceptual and system reasons, why it is virtually an impossibility for the JB to construct a system of GAL oversight without violating very important traditional principles that are embedded in administering the law. This is not in any way to suggest that these principles are not vitally important and necessary in a court of law and need to be respected. It is simply to try to understand why these same respected principles that work so well in court render supervision of GALs virtually impossible in Judicial systems. It is the reason why many states have surrendered to the impossibility of doing supervision/oversight within their judicial branch and moved these activities to the administrative/executive branch.
Maine should do this for the same reasons.
For more information on the issues of
Guardians ad litem we encourage you to read the 2006 OPEGA report.
Provided is a link to a summary – OPEGA. In addition there is the
report the Power of the Powerless which addresses many of the same
issues. If you have had any issues with Guardians ad litem we
encourage you to contact us for support at NationalGALalert@gmail.com
or like us on Facebook for information.
Thursday, November 22, 2012
No Management or Oversight for Guardians ad litem in the last 40 years
In 2006 OPEGA ( Office of Program Evaluation and Government
Accountability ) produced a report highlighting some of the problems
with the Guardian ad litem program in Maine. What OPEGA highlighted back
in 2006 for Maine are issues that sadly can be seen in many states
across the country.
One of the audit findings by OPEGA was that there is a lack of compliance, performance controls and evaluation systems. The Judicial Branch has not been competent when it comes to oversight or performance monitoring in the 30+ years prior to the report. Six years later we find the Judicial Branch still without any quality controls in place to monitor and evaluate Guardians ad litem. There is no mechanism to identify GALs that are not complying with requirements or who are not involved in the lives of the child(ren). OPEGA also recommended the establishment of an independent oversight board that would ask for feedback on GAL performance. Being able to give feedback and having a place where this feedback, good or bad, is available for consumers would help in the matter of oversight and management. An Angie’s list of sorts would weed out under performing GALs or limit their business. Those that perform to standards would be rewarded for their ethics and behavior.
It was 30+ years before OPEGA investigated and reported on this issue. Six years later the situation has not changed except that there has been 6 more years of damage to Maine's families and children. How much longer will Maine's children have to wait for change to come? If we wait for the Judicial Branch to bring about change it may be another 40 years. Can we wait that long?
If you want to read a summarized copy of the 2006 OPEGA report click here.
A copy of the report done in 2012 – the Power of the Powerless which covers many of the same issues can be found here.
If you are or know someone who has had issues with a Guardian ad litem please contact us for support at NationalGALalert@gmail.com. We can also be found on Facebook.
One of the audit findings by OPEGA was that there is a lack of compliance, performance controls and evaluation systems. The Judicial Branch has not been competent when it comes to oversight or performance monitoring in the 30+ years prior to the report. Six years later we find the Judicial Branch still without any quality controls in place to monitor and evaluate Guardians ad litem. There is no mechanism to identify GALs that are not complying with requirements or who are not involved in the lives of the child(ren). OPEGA also recommended the establishment of an independent oversight board that would ask for feedback on GAL performance. Being able to give feedback and having a place where this feedback, good or bad, is available for consumers would help in the matter of oversight and management. An Angie’s list of sorts would weed out under performing GALs or limit their business. Those that perform to standards would be rewarded for their ethics and behavior.
It was 30+ years before OPEGA investigated and reported on this issue. Six years later the situation has not changed except that there has been 6 more years of damage to Maine's families and children. How much longer will Maine's children have to wait for change to come? If we wait for the Judicial Branch to bring about change it may be another 40 years. Can we wait that long?
If you want to read a summarized copy of the 2006 OPEGA report click here.
A copy of the report done in 2012 – the Power of the Powerless which covers many of the same issues can be found here.
If you are or know someone who has had issues with a Guardian ad litem please contact us for support at NationalGALalert@gmail.com. We can also be found on Facebook.
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